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For many consumer packaged goods products, researchers have documented a form of state dependence
whereby consumers become "loyal" to products they have consumed in the past. That is, consumers
behave as though there is a utility premium from continuing to purchase the same product as they have
purchased in the past or, equivalently, there is a psychological cost to switching products. However,
it has not been established that this form of state dependence can be identified in the presence of consumer
heterogeneity of an unknown form. Most importantly, before this inertia can be given a structural interpretation
and used in policy experiments such as counterfactual pricing exercises,alternative explanations which
might give rise to similar consumer behavior must be ruled out. We develop a flexible model of heterogeneity
which can be given a semi-parametric interpretation and rule out alternative explanations for positive
state dependence such as autocorrelated choice errors, consumer search, or consumer learning.
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Researchers in both economics and marketing have documented a form of persistence in con-
sumer choice data in which consumers have a higher probability of choosing products that
they have consumed in the recent past (see, for example, Keane (1997) and Seetharaman,
Ainslie, and Chintagunta (1999)). Typically, the data used to document these ﬁndings are
consumer panels recording purchases of branded products. Accordingly, we will term this
form of persistence, inertia in brand choice. Inertia is typically captured by a choice model
speciﬁcation which includes lagged choice variables. A structural interpretation of this model
is that past purchases alter the utility derived from further consumption of the same goods or
that consumers face some sort of psychological switching costs in changing brands. To distin-
guish structural interpretations from purely statistical measures, we will term the structural
interpretation, state dependence in choice. The distinction between statistical and structural
interpretations of persistence in choice is important from the point of view of evaluating
optimal ﬁrm policies such as optimal pricing.
There are two parts to our investigation. We document that inertia in brand choice exists
and is not due to a mis-speciﬁed distribution of heterogeneity in preferences or autocorrelated
choice errors. We then consider if the observed inertia can be interpreted as a structural
model of state dependence or is simply proxying for costly search or learning.
A standard alternative explanation for state dependence is that choice model errors are
autocorrelated. Although this gives rise to inertial behavior in choice, the implications for
ﬁrm policy are quite di erent. Firms facing consumers with auto-correlated errors have no
way to inﬂuence the degree to which consumers are “loyal” to their products, while under the
state dependent interpretation consumers can be induced to be loyal by price reductions and
other promotional activities. We implement tests to conclude that autocorrelated errors are
unlikely to be the source of observed inertia.
Another possible source of measured inertia could be mis-speciﬁcation of the distribution
of consumer heterogeneity in brand preferences and price sensitivity. It is well known that it is
di cult to distinguish between state dependence and heterogeneity. It is particularly di cult
2to do so if the entire set of taste parameters are consumer-speciﬁc. For example, there is no
compeling argument to assume that consumer di erences are conﬁned to brand intercepts.
The data requirements for separating hetergeneity from state dependence are formidable. Not
only must moderately long panels of consumers be recorded but there must be some form of
exogenous brand switching which allows for a shift in the loyalty “state.” Fortunately, panel
data on consumer packaged goods is captured in environments where there are frequent price
discounts. These price discounts induce brand switching and should induce state dependence.
The empirical literature on state dependence assumes a normal distribution of heterogene-
ity1. There is no particular reason to assume that distributions of taste parameters should
exhibit symmetric and unimodal distributions. In might be argued, for example, that the dis-
tribution of brand intercepts should be multi-modal, corresponding to di erent relative brand
preferences for di erent groups of consumers. In order to establish that state dependence ﬁnd-
ings are robust to distributional assumptions, we implement a very ﬂexible, semi-parametric
speciﬁcation consisting of a mixture of multivariate normal distributions. While we argue
that our Bayesian methods provide extreme ﬂexibility while retaining desirable smoothness
properties, we also consider a form of model-free evidence that our heterogeneity speciﬁcation
is adequate.
It can be argued that persistence is not derived from state dependence but could be the
result a costly search process. With high search costs, consumers may be reluctant to pay
the search cost to sample other brands. We demonstrate that, while we can’t eliminate the
existence of search costs explanations, they do not seem to be the driving force behind the
measured state dependence. To draw these conclusions, we make use of the availability of local
store advertising which is determined exogeneous to individual consumer choice but changes
search costs.
Others have advanced the hypothesis (see for example, Osborne (2007) and Moshkin and
Shachar (2002)) that learning behavior could give rise to inertia in choices. A generic impli-
cation of learning models is that choice behavior will be non-stationary even when consumers
1See, for example, Keane (1997), Seetharaman, Ainslie, and Chintagunta (1999), and Osborne (2007).
Shum (2004) uses discrete distribution of heterogeneity.
3face a stationary store environment. As consumers obtain more experience with any set of
products, the amount of learning declines and their posterior beliefs on product quality con-
verge to a degenerate distribution. On the other hand, a state dependence model implies that
there will be a stationary distribution of consumer choice, given a stationary input process for
prices. We use this key feature to distinguish learning from state dependence and see little
evidence of learning.
Our goal is to document that state dependence survives a battery of tests and alternative
explanations and provide support for those who wish to interpret state dependence as a
structural model of utility. In a separate paper (Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi (forthcoming)), we
explore the implications of models with inertia for equilibrium prices under the assumption
that the inertial terms can be given a structural interpretation.
2 Model and Econometric Speciﬁcation
Our baseline model consists of households making discrete choices among J products in a cat-
egory and an outside option each time they go to the supermarket. The timing and incidence
of trips to the supermarket, indexed by t, are assumed to be exogenous. To capture inertia in
choices, we take the standard approach, often termed “state-dependent demand,” and assume
that current utilities are a ected by the previous product chosen in the category. For ease of
exposition, we drop the household-speciﬁc index below. In the empirical speciﬁcation, all the
model parameters will be household speciﬁc.
The utility index from product j at time period t is
ujt =  j +  pjt +  I {st = j} +  jt (2.1)
where pjt is the product price2 and  jt is the standard iid error term used in most choice
models. In the model given by (2.1), the brand intercepts represent a persistent form of vertical
2Other characteristics of the store environment facing the household could be entered into the “utility”
model. But, then it may be problematic to interpret this as a utility speciﬁcation. For example, many
researchers include in-store advertising variables directly in the choice model. In Section 5, we consider a
search-theoretic interpretation of the role of displays.
4product di erentiation that captures a household’s intrinsic product (or brand) preferences.
st  {1,...,J} summarizes the history of past purchases from the perspective of impact on
current utility. If a household buys product k in period t   1, then st = k. If the household
chooses the outside option, then the household’s state remains unchanged: st = st 1. Some
term st the “loyalty” state of the household. If st = j, the household is said to be “loyal”
to brand j. While the use of the last purchase as the summary of the past purchases is
very frequently used in empirical work, it is by no means the only possible speciﬁcation. For
example, Seetharaman (2004) considers various distributed lags of past purchases.
If  > 0, then the model in (2.1) will generate a form of inertia. If a household switches to
brand k, the probability of a repeat purchase of brand k is higher than prior to this purchase.
One possible interpretation is that   results a form of psychological switching costs (see Farrell
and Klemperer (2006)).
2.1 Econometric Speciﬁcation
At the household level (indexed by h), we specify a multinomial logit model with the outside
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drawn from a common distribution. In the empirical literature on state dependent demand,
a normal distribution is often assumed,  h   N
 ¯  ,V 
 
. Frequently, further restrictions are
placed on V  such as a diagonal structure (see, for example, Osborne (2007)). Other authors
restrict the heterogeneity to only a subset of the   vector. The use of restricted normal models
is due, in part, to the limitations of existing methods for estimation of random coe cient logit
models.
If normal models for heterogeneity are unable to capture the full distribution of hetero-
geneity, then there is the potential to create a spurious ﬁnding of interia or the importance of
5state dependence. For example, consider the situation in which there is a bimodal distribution
of preferences for a particular brand. One mode corresponds to a sub-population of consumers
who ﬁnd the brand relatively superior to other brands in the choice set, while the other mode
corresponds to consumers who ﬁnd this brand relatively inferior. The normal approximation
to a bi-modal distribution would be symmetric and centered at zero. The normal would not
exhibit much in the way of di erences in brand preferences (certainly not as much as the
bimodal distribution). When applied to data, the model with the normal distribution would
have a likelihood that puts mass on positive inertia parameter values in order to accomodate
the observation that some households persistently buy (do not buy) one of the brands.
Rather than restricting the distribution of parameters across households, we want to
allow for the possibility of non-normal and ﬂexible distributions. This poses a challenging
econometric problem. Even if we were to observe the
 
 h 
without error, we would be
faced with the problem of estimating a high dimensional distribution (in the applications
below, we estimate models with 5-10 dimensional distributions). In practice, we have only
imperfect information regarding household level parameters which adds to the econometric
challenge. Even with hundreds of households, we may only have limited information for any
one household given that there are typically not more than 50 observations per household.
This requires a method that does not overﬁt the data. One approach to the problem of
overﬁtting is to use proper prior distributions which create forms of smoothing and parameter
shrinkage.
Our approach is to specify a hierarchical prior with a mixture of normals as the ﬁrst stage
prior (see, for example, section 5.2 of Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch (2005)).The hierarchical
prior provides one convenient way of specifying an informative prior which avoids the problem
of overﬁtting even with a large number of normal components. The ﬁrst stage is a mixture














 ,{µk, k}|b (2.4)
6Here the notation ·|· indicates a conditional distribution and b represents the hyper-parameters
of the priors on the mixing probabilities and the parameters governing each mixture compo-
nent.
As is well-known, a mixture of normals models is very ﬂexible and can accommodate
deviations from normality such as thick tails, skewness, and multi-modality. A priori, we might
expect that brand preference parameters (intercepts) might have a multi-modal distribution.
The modes might correspond to sub-groups of consumers who very much like, very much
dislike, or who are indi erent to the brand. In addition, we might expect the distribution
of price coe cients to be skewed left since consumers should behave in accordance with a
negative price coe cient and there may be some extremely price sensitive consumers. At the
same time, we do not expect preference parameters to be independent. Thus, we are faced
with the task of ﬁtting a multivariate mixture of normals.
A useful alternative representation of the model in (2.3) and (2.4) can be obtained by
introducing a latent set of variables which indicate which component each consumer is drawn
from.
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(2.5)
indh is a multinomial variable with probability vector,  . This representation is precisely that
which would be used to simulate data from a mixture of normals, but it is also the same idea
used in the MCMC method for Bayesian inference in this model, as detailed in the appendix.
Viewed as a prior, (2.5) puts positive prior probability on mixtures with di erent numbers of
components, including mixtures with a smaller number of components than K. For example,
consider a model that is speciﬁed with a large number of components, K = 10. A priori,
there is a positive probability that indh  {1,...,5}. This is also possible a posteriori. This
property of the posterior is important for parsimony. A posteriori, it is possible that some
mixture components are “shut down” in the sense that they have very low probability and are
never visited during the navigation of the posterior.
7While the mixture of normals model (2.3) is notoriously di cult to ﬁt via maximization
methods, Bayesian MCMC methods are well-suited to conducting inference to this problem.
The proper priors that form the second stage of the hierarchical model insure that the poles
and other singularities that plague a maximization approach are avoided. Rossi, Allenby,
and McCulloch (2005) deﬁne a special customized hybrid Metropolis MCMC algorithm for
this model which is automatically tuned to each of the household level likelihoods (see pp.
135-136). This is particularly important for application to consumer choice data as some
households will not be observed to choose from among all possible choice alternatives and a
household-level MLE will be undeﬁned for these households. Standard hybrid MCMC meth-
ods for hierarchical logit models (see the excellent survey on MCMC methods by Chib (2001))
are simply infeasible for data that include incomplete purchase histories. The Appendix pro-
vides details of the MCMC algorithm and prior settings.
Our MCMC algorithm provides draws of the mixture probabilities as well as the normal
component parameters. Thus, each MCMC draw of the mixture parameters provides a draw
of the entire multivariate density of household parameters. We can average these densities to
provide a Bayes estimate of the household parameter density. We can also construct Bayesian
Highest Posterior Density (HPD) regions3 for any given density ordinate to gauge the level
of uncertainty in the estimation of the household distribution using the simulation draws.
That is, for any given ordinate, we can estimate the density of the distribution of either all
or a subset of the parameters. In particular, marginals distributions can be calculated by
exploiting the fact that the marginal distribution of a sub vector of a mixture of multivariate
normals is the same mixture of the appropriate marginals for each component. A single draw









 i (t|µk, k) is the univariate marginal density for the ith component of the multivariate
3The Bayesian Highest Posterior Density region is the Bayesian analogue of the conﬁdence interval. The
95 percent HPD is an interval which has .95 probability under the posterior. We can compute estimates of
the HPD by using quantiles from the MCMC draws.
8normal distribution,  (µk, k).
Some might argue that you do not have a truly non-parametric method unless you can
claim that your procedure consistently recovers the true density of parameters in the pop-
ulation of all possible households. In the mixture of normals model, this requires that the
number of mixture components (K) increases with the sample size. Our approach is to ﬁt
models with successively larger numbers of components and gauge the adequacy of the number
of components by examining the ﬁtted density as well as the Bayes factor (see model selection
discussion below) associated with each number of components. What is important to note
is that our improved MCMC algorithm is capable of ﬁtting models with a large number of
components at relatively low computational cost.
2.2 Posterior Model Probabilities
In order to establish that the inertia we observe in the data can be interpreted as a true
state dependent utility, we will compare a variety of di erent speciﬁcations. Most of the
speciﬁcations we will consider will be heterogeneous in that a prior distribution or random
coe cient speciﬁcation will be assumed for all utility parameters. This poses a problem in
model comparison as we are comparing di erent and heterogeneous models. As a simple
example, consider a model with and without the lagged choice term. This is not simply a
hypothesis about a given ﬁxed dimensional parameter, H0 :  =0, but a hypothesis about a set
of household level parameters. The Bayesian solution to this problem is to compute posterior
model probabilities and compare models on this basis. A posterior model probability is
computed by integrating out the set of model parameters to form what is termed the marginal
likelihood of the data. Consider the computation of the posterior probability of model Mi:
p(Mi|D)=
 
p(D| ,M i)p( |Mi)d    p(Mi) (2.7)
where D denotes the observed data,   represents the set of model parameters, p(D| ,M 1)
is the likelihood of the data for M1, and p(Mi) is the prior probability of model i. The ﬁrst
9term in (2.7 ) is the marginal likelihood for Mi.
p(D|Mi)=
 
p(D| ,M i)p( |Mi)d  (2.8)
The marginal likelihood can be computed by reusing the simulation draws for all model












p(D| ,M i) is the likelihood of the entire panel for model i. In order to minimize overﬂow
problems, we report the log of the trimmed Newton-Raftery MCMC estimate of the marginal
likelihood. Bayesian Model comparison can be done on the basis of the marginal likelihood
(assuming equal prior model probabilities).
Posterior model probabilities can be shown to have an automatic adjustment for the e ec-
tive parameter dimension. That is, larger models do not automatically have higher marginal
likelihood as the dimension of the problem is one aspect of the prior that always matters.
While we do not use asymptotic approximations to the posterior model probabilities, the
asymptotic approximation to the marginal likelihood illustrates the implicit penalty for larger
models (see, for example, Rossi, McCulloch, and Allenby (1996)).










pi is the e ective parameter size for Mi and n is the sample size. Thus, a model with the
same ﬁt or likelihood value but a larger number of parameters will be “penalized” in marginal
likelihood terms. Choosing models on the basis of marginal likelihood can be shown to be
consistent in model selection in the sense that the true model will be selected with higher and
higher probability as the sample size becomes inﬁnite.
103 Data
For our empirical analysis, we estimate the logit demand model described above using house-
hold panel data containing all purchase behavior for the refrigerated orange juice and the 16 oz
tub margarine categories. The panel data were collected by AC Nielsen for 2,100 households
in a large Midwestern city between 1993 and 1995. In each category, we focus only on those
households that purchase a brand at least twice during our sample period. Hence we use 355
households to estimate orange juice, and 429 households to estimate margarine demand.
Table 1 lists the products considered in each category as well as the purchase incidence,
product shares and average prices. We deﬁne the outside good in each category as follows. In
the refrigerated orange juice category, we deﬁne the outside good as any fresh or canned juice
product purchase other than the brands of orange juice considered. In the tub margarine
category, we deﬁne the outside good as any spreadable product i.e. jams, jellies, margarine,
butter, peanut butter etc). In Table 1, we see a no-purchase share of roughly 24%, in refrig-
erated juice, and 46% in tub margarine. We use this deﬁnition of the outside good to model
only those shopping trips where purchases in the product category are considered.
In our econometric speciﬁcation, we will be careful to control for heterogeneity as ﬂexibly
as possible to avoid confounding loyalty with unobserved heterogeneity. Even with these
controls in place, it is still important to ask which patterns in our consumer shopping panel
give rise to the identiﬁcation of inertial or state dependent e ects. The marginal purchase
probability is considerably smaller than the re-purchase probability for all products considered.
While this evidence is consistent with inertia, it could also be a reﬂection of heterogeneity in
consumer tastes for brands. The identiﬁcation of inertia in our context relies on the frequent
temporary price changes typically observed in supermarket scanner data. If there is su cient
price variation, we will observe consumers switching away from their preferred products. The
detection of state dependence relies on spells during which the consumer purchases these less-
preferred alternatives on successive visits, even after prices return to their “typical” levels.
We use the orange juice category to illustrate the source of identiﬁcation of inertia or state
dependence in our data. First, we observe spells during which a household repeat-purchases
11the same product. Conditional on a purchase, we observe 1889 such repeat-purchases out
of our total 3328 purchases in the category. Second, we observe numerous instances during
which a spell is initiated by a discount price. We classify each product’s weekly prices as either
“regular” or “discount,” where the latter implies a temporary price decrease of at least 5%.
Focusing on non-favorite products, i.e. products that are not the most frequently purchased
by a household, nearly 60% of the purchases are for products o ering a temporary price
discount. We compare the repeat-purchase rate for spells initiated by a price discount (i.e.
a household repeat-buys a product that was on discount when they previously purchased it)
to the marginal probability of a purchase in Table 2. For all brands of Minute Maid orange
juice, the sample repurchase probability conditional on a purchase initiated by a discount is
.74, which exceeds the marginal purchase probability of .43. The same is true for Tropicana
brand products with the conditional repurchase probability of .83 compared to the marginal
purchase probability of .57. This is suggestive that observed high repurchase rates are not
simply the result of strong brand preferences but are caused by some sort of inertia.
Inertia or persistence in brand choices can be viewed as one possible source of dependence
in choices over time even for the same consumer. Another frequently cited source of non-zero
order purchase behavior is household inventory holdings (see, for example, Erdem, Imai, and
Keane (2003)). If households have some sort of storage technology, then they may amass
a household inventory either to reduce shopping costs (assuming there is a category-speciﬁc
ﬁxed cost of shopping) or to exploit a sale or price discount of short duration. It should be
emphasized that household stock-piling has implications for the quantity of purchases as well
as the timing of purchases. Our state dependence formulation suggests that the speciﬁc brand
purchased on the last shopping trip should inﬂuence the current brand choice. A model of
stock-piling simply suggests that as the time between purchases increases the hazard rate of
purchase should increase. We neither use the quantity of purchase nor the timing of purchase
incidence in our analysis. Finally, we should note that the possibilities for household inventory
of the products (especially, refrigerated orange juice) appear to be limited. In our data, over
80 per cent of all purchases are for one unit of the product, suggesting that stock-piling is not
12pervasive.
4 Inertia, Heterogeneity, and Robustness
Heterogeneity and State Dependence
It is well-known that state dependence and heterogeneity can be confounded (Heckman
(1981)). We have argued that frequent price discounts or sales provide a source of brand
switching that can identify inertia or state dependence in choices separately from hetero-
geneity in household preferences. However, it is an empirical question as to whether or not
inertia is an important force in our data. With a normal distribution of heterogeneity, a
number of authors have documented that positive state dependence or inertia is present in
CPG panel data (see, for example, Seetharaman, Ainslie, and Chintagunta (1999)). Frank
(1962) and Massy (1966) document state dependence at the panelist level using older diary
data. However, there is still the possibility that these results conﬁrming inertia are not robust
to controls for heterogeneity using a ﬂexible or non-parametric distribution of preferences.
Our approach is to ﬁt models with and without an inertia term and with and without various
forms of heterogeneity. It is particularly convenient that our mixture of normals approach
nests the normal model in the literature.
Table 3 provides log marginal likelihood results that facilitate assessment of the statistical
importance of heterogeneity and inertia. All log marginal likelihoods are estimated using a
Newton-Raftery style estimator that has been trimmed of the top and bottom 1 per cent of
likelihood values as is recommended in the literature. We compare models without hetero-
geneity to a normal model (a one component mixture) and to ﬁve and ten mixture component
models.
As is often the case with consumer panel data (Allenby and Rossi (1999)), there is pro-
nounced heterogeneity. In a model with an inertia or state dependence term included, the
introduction of normal heterogeneity improves the model ﬁt dramatically. The log marginal
likelihood improves by more 20 percent when normal heterogeneity is introduced. If two
13models have equal prior probability, the di erence in log marginal likelihood is related to the






= log(p(D|M1))   log(p(D|M2)) (4.1)
Introduction of normal heterogeneity improves the log marginal likelihood by more than 100
points, such that the ratio of posterior probabilities is more than exp(100), providing over-
whelming evidence in favor of a model with heterogeneity in both product categories.
The normal model of heterogeneity does not appear to be adequate for our data as the
log marginal likelihood improves substantially (by at least 50 points) when a ﬁve component
mixture model is used. For example, for margarine products in a model with an inertia term,
moving from one to ﬁve normal components increases the log marginal likelihood from -5613
to -5550. Remember that the Bayesian approach automatically adjusts for e ective parameter
size (see section 2.2) and the increase in log marginal density observed in Table 3 represents
a meaningful improvement in ﬁt.
Figures 1-4 provide direct evidence on the importance of a ﬂexible distribution of hetero-
geneity. Each ﬁgure plots the estimated marginal distribution of intercept, price, and inertia
or “state dependence” coe cients from the ﬁve component mixture in blue (here we use the
posterior mean as the Bayes estimate of each density value. The yellow envelope enclosing the
ﬁve component marginal densities is a 90 percent pointwise HPD region. The one component
ﬁtted density is drawn in red. A number of the parameters exhibit a dramatic departure from
normality. For example, the Shedd’s brand of margarine has a noticeably bimodal marginal
distribution across households. One mode is centered on a positive value (all intercepts should
be interpreted as relative to the “outside” good which is deﬁned as other products in the cat-
egory) indicating strong brand preference for Shedd. The other mode is centered on a value
closer to zero, reﬂecting consumers who view Shedd’s as comparable to other products in
the category. One could argue that distributions with multiple modes are more likely to be
the norm rather than the exception with any set of branded products. The price coe cient
(Figures 2 and 4) is also non-normal, exhibiting pronounced left skewness. Again, this might
14be expected that there is a left tail of extremely price sensitive consumers. We note that the
prior distribution for the price coe cient is symmetric and centered at zero.
Thus, there is good reason to doubt the appropriateness of the standard normal assumption
for many choice model parameters. This opens the possibility that the ﬁndings documenting
the importance of state dependence or inertia in choices are inﬂuenced, at least in part, by
arbitrary distributional assumptions. However, the importance of the inertia or “state depen-
dence” remains even when a ﬂexible ﬁve component normal is speciﬁed. The log marginal
likelihood increases from -5575 to -5501 when inertia terms are added to a ﬁve component
model for margarine and from -4528 to -4434 in refrigerated orange juice. Figures 2 and 4
show that the marginal distribution of the inertia parameter is well approximated by a normal
distribution for these two product categories. While this is not deﬁnitive evidence, it does
suggest that the ﬁndings of inertia or state dependence in the literature are not artifacts of
the normality assumption commonly used.
The ﬁve component normal mixture is a very ﬂexible model for the joint density of choice
model parameters. However, before we can make a more generic “semi-parametric” claim
that our results are not dependent on the form of the distribution, we must provide evidence
of the adequacy of the ﬁve component distributional model. Our approach to this is to ﬁt
a ten component model. Many would consider this to be an absurdly highly parametrized
model. For the margarine category, the ten component model would have a “nominal” number
of 449 parameters (the coe cient vector is 8 dimensional4). The log marginal likelihood
declines from ﬁve to ten components; from -5551 to -5559 for margarine and -4434 to -
4435 for orange juice. These results marginally favor the 5 component model over the 10
component, but, more importantly, indicate no value from increasing the model ﬂexibility
beyond ﬁve components. We feel that the posterior model probability results in conjunction
with the high ﬂexibility of the models under consideration justify the conclusion that we have
accommodated heterogeneity of an unknown form.
4There are 36 x 10 = 360 unique variance-covariance parameters plus 10 x 8 mean parameters plus 9
mixture probabilites = 449.
15Robustness Checks
State Dependence or a Mis-Speciﬁed Distribution of Heterogeneity? Some may
still doubt if we have indeed found inertia or if the lagged choice coe cient simply proxies for
a mis-speciﬁcation of the distribution of heterogeneity. We perform a simple check to test for
this possibility. Suppose there is no state dependence and that the coe cient on the lagged
choice picks up taste di erences across households that are not accounted for by the assumed
functional form of heterogeneity. Then, if we randomly reshu e the order of shopping trips,
the coe cient on the lagged choice will not change and still provide misleading evidence for
inertia. In Table 3 we show the log marginal likelihood for a ﬁve component model with an
inertia term, which we ﬁtted to our data with randomly reshu ed purchase sequences. The
log marginal likelihood for the randomized sequence data is approximately the same as for
the model without the inertia terms, and much lower than the log marginal density of the
model with properly ordered data and the inertia term. We thus ﬁnd strong evidence against
the possibility that the lagged choice proxies for a mis-speciﬁed heterogeneity distribution.
State Dependence or Autocorrelation? While the randomized sequence test gives us
conﬁdence that we have found convincing evidence of a non-zero order choice process, it
does not help distinguish between an inertia or state dependence model and a model with
auto-correlated choice errors. Using normal models and a di erent estimation method, Keane
(1997) ﬁnds that state dependent and auto-correlated error models produce very similar re-
sults. However, the economic implications of the two models are markedly di erent. With a
structural interpretation for inertia as a form of state dependent utility, ﬁrms can inﬂuence
the loyalty state of the customer and this has, for example, long-run pricing implications,
while the autocorrelated errors model does not allow for interventions to induce inertia or
loyalty to speciﬁc brands.
In order to distinguish between a model with a lagged choice or state dependent regressor
and a model with autocorrelated errors, we implement the suggestion of Chamberlain (1985).
We consider a model with a ﬁve component normal mixture for heterogeneity, no lagged
16choice or state dependent term, but including the lagged prices deﬁned as the prices at the
last purchase occasion. In a model with state dependence, price can inﬂuence the loyalty
(or state) variable and this will inﬂuence subsequent choices. In contrast, in a model with
auto correlated errors, it is not possible to inﬂuence persistence in choices using exogenous
variables. In Table 3, we compare the log marginal likelihood of the model without state
dependence and a ﬁve component normal mixture with the log marginal likelihood of the
same model including lagged prices. For margarine, the addition of lagged prices improves
the log marginal likelihood by more than 50 points and by morethan 100 points for refrigerated
orange juice. This is strong evidence in favor of a “state dependence” speciﬁcation with lagged
choices.
A limitation of the Chamberlain suggestion (as noted by both Chamberlain himself and
Erdem and Sun (2001)) is that consumer expectations regarding prices (and other right hand
side variables) might inﬂuence current choice decisions. Lagged prices might simply proxy for
expectations even though there is no state dependence at all. Thus, the importance of lagged
prices as measured by the log marginal likelihood is suggestive but not deﬁnitive.
As another comparison between a model with auto correlated errors and a state dependent
model, we exploit the price discounts or sales in our data. Since auto correlated errors are not
synchronized across households nor with price discounting by the retailer, we can di erentiate
between state dependent and auto-correlated error models by examining the impact of price
discounts on measured state dependence. The intuition for this test is as follows. In a world
of serially correlated errors, households that are induced by price discounts to switch to a
new product will not exhibit inertia or persistence in choice. However, in a world with state
dependence, brand switching induced by any reason should create persistence. To implement
this idea, we interact the loyalty variable with an indicator for whether the loyalty state was
initiated by a discount or not (i.e. whether the last product purchased was purchased on
discount).
ujt =  j +  jpjt +  1I {st = j} +  2I {st = j}·I {discountst = j} +  jt (4.2)
17The term, discountt, indicates whether the brand to which the consumer is currently loyal
was on discount when it was last purchased. In a model with auto-correlated errors, the
loyalty e ect should dissipate for loyalty states generated by discounts, i.e.  1 +  2 =0 .
Table 3 provides a comparison of the log marginal likelihoods for the speciﬁcation in (4.2);
the log marginal likelihood values for the discount interaction term are in the last row of the
table. The interaction term does improve model ﬁt but by a modest 15-20 log density points.
It remains an open question as to whether measured state dependence changes materially
when we compare the distribution of the state dependence conditional on a past purchase
that was or was not on discount. Recall that we allow for an entire distribution of parameters
across the population of consumers so that we cannot provide the Bayesian analogue of a point
estimate and a conﬁdence interval. Instead, we plot the ﬁtted marginal distribution of  1 and
 1+ 2 in ﬁgure 5. The blue density curve is from our baseline model without any interaction
term (2.1), the red is the inertial or state dependence e ect conditional on a discount on the
focal brand during the previous purchase occasion (labelled “lagged sale”) (denoted  1 in 4.2),
and the green is the e ect conditional on no discount (labelled “no lagged sale”) (denoted
 1 +  2 in 4.2). There is little di erence between the three densities for the orange juice
category and a slight shift toward zero with a lagged sale in the margarine category. We
conclude that there is scant evidence to support the claim that auto correlated errors are the
source of measured inertia.
Brand-Speciﬁc State Dependence
In the basic utility speciﬁcation (2.1), the inertia e ects are governed by one parameter that is
constrained to be the same across brands for the same household. There is no particular reason
to impose this constraint other than parsimony. Several authors have found the measurement
of inertial e ects to be di cult (see, for example, Keane (1997), Seetharaman, Ainslie, and
Chintagunta (1999), and Erdem and Sun (2001)) even with a one component normal model
for heterogeneity. The reason for imposing one “state dependence” or inertia parameter could
simply be a need for greater e ciency in estimation. However, it would be misleading to
18report state dependent e ects if these are limited to, for example, only one brand in a set of
products. It also might be expected that some brands with unique packaging or trade-marks
might display greater inertia than others. It is also possible that the formulation of some
products may induce more inertia via some mild form of “addiction” in that some tastes are
more habit-forming than others. For these reasons, we consider an alternative formulation of
the state dependence model with brand-speciﬁc loyalty parameters. Our Bayesian methods
have a natural advantage for more highly parametrized models in the sense that if a model is
weakly identiﬁed from the data, the prior keeps the posterior well-deﬁned and regular.
A ﬁve component mixture of normals with brand speciﬁc inertia ﬁts the data with a
higher log marginal likelihood for both categories. For margarine, the log marginal likelihood
increases from -5551 to -5505 when brand speciﬁc e ects are introduced into state dependence.
There is an even more dramatic increase for the orange juice products, from -4436 to -4364.
However, there is a di erence between substantive and statistical signiﬁcance. For this reason,
we plot the ﬁtted marginal densities for the inertia or “state dependence” parameters for each
brand in ﬁgures 6 and 7. The distributions displayed in ﬁgure 6 compare the baseline model
with models that allow for di erent inertia distributions for each brand. Interestingly, all
four distributions are centered close to the baseline, constrained speciﬁcation. In the orange
juice category, ﬁgure 7 plots the distributions of inertia parameters for the four highest share
brands. In this category, the 96oz brands have higher inertia than the 64oz brands. We should
note that the prior distribution5 on the inertia parameters is centered at zero and very di use.
This means that data has moved us to a posterior which is much tighter than the prior and
moved the center of mass away from zero. Thus, our results are not simply due to the prior
speciﬁcation but are the result of evidence in our data.
The main conclusion is that allowing for brand-speciﬁc inertia does not reduce the impor-
tance of inertial e ects nor restrict these e ects to a small subset of brands.
5It should be noted that, as detailed in the appendix, our “prior” is a prior on the parameters of the mixture
of normals – the mixing probabilities and each component mean vector and covariance matrix. This induces
a prior on the distribution over parameters and the resultant marginal densities. While this is of no known
analytic form, the fact that our priors on each component parameters are di use mean that the prior on the
distributions is also di use.
195 Alternative Sources of Inertia: Search and Learning
We have established that inertial e ects remain even with a very ﬂexible distribution of
heterogeneity, are robust to mis-speciﬁcation of heterogeneity and are unlikely to be the result
of auto correlated taste shocks. This holds out the possibility that changes in the exogenous
variables such as price can change the brands for which households exhibit inertia and, thus,
may have implications for ﬁrm policy. However, to evaluate these ﬁrm policy implications
requires a structural interpretation that the inertia term represents a form of state dependence
in which the utility for brands that have been recently purchased is altered. In this section, we
consider the role of consumer search and product learning as possible alternative explanations.
We assess the extent to which our ﬁndings of inertia in brand purchase might be explained,
not by state dependent utility, but by search or learning behavior. We do not postulate
speciﬁc structural models of search or learning which would involve some strong structural
assumptions on consumer behavior. Rather, we focus on aspects of consumer behavior that
di erentiate search or learning explanations from state dependence and that can be directly
observed in our data.
Search
There can be no doubt that consumers face search costs in the recall of identities and location
of products in a store. Hoyer (1984) found that consumers spent, on average, only 13 seconds
“from the time they entered the aisle to complete their in-store decision.” Furthermore, only
11% of consumers examined 2 or more products before making a choice in a given product
category. Facing high search costs, consumers may purchase the products that they can easily
recall or locate in the store. These products are likely to be the products which the consumer
has purchased most recently. In this situation, consumers would display persistence or inertia
in product choice as they may not be willing to pay the implicit search costs for investigating
products other than those recently purchased.
In order to distinguish between inertia due to state dependence and inertia due to high
search costs, we exploit data on in-store advertising, sometimes termed “display” advertising.
20Retailers frequently add signage and even rearrange the products in the aisle so as to call
attention to speciﬁc products. In the refrigerated orange juice category, 17.5% of the chosen
items had an in-store display during the shopping trip (in the margarine category displays are
seldom present)6. A display can be thought of as an intervention that reduces a consumer’s
search cost.
In the marketing literature, it is often assumed that consumers only choose among a subset
of products in any given category. This subset is called the consideration set. Mehta, Rajiv,
and Srinivasan (2003) construct a model for consideration set formation based on a ﬁxed
sample size search process. Using data for ketchup and laundry detergent products, they ﬁnd
that promotional activity, such as in-store displays, increase the likelihood that a product
enters a consideration set. This work a rms the idea that in-store displays can reduce search
costs.
If displays a ect demand via search costs, we should expect that a display increases the
probability of a purchase. In addition, if a consumer has purchased a speciﬁc product in the
past (st = j), then displays on other products should reduce the inertial e ect or the tendency
for the consumer to continue to purchase product j. This can be implemented by adding a
speciﬁc interaction term to the baseline utility model:
ujt =  j+ pjt+ 1I {st = j}+ 2I {st  = j}·I {displayjt =1 }+ I {displayjt =1 }+ jt (5.1)
To illustrate the coding of the interaction term in (5.1), consider the case of two brands
and various display and inertia state conditions. If the consumer has purchased brand 1 in
the past (st = 1) and neither brand is on display, then utility for brand 1 relative to brand
2 is increased by  1. If brand 1 is on display, the utility di erence increases by  . If brand
2 is also on display, the main e ect of display,  , cancels out, but the interaction term turns
on with the potential to o set the inertia e ect. The di erence between the utility for brand
1 and brand 2 due to state dependence and displays will be  1    2. Thus,  2 measures the
6There is a good deal of independent variation between displays and price discounts. No correlation between
the display dummy variable and the level of prices exceeds 0.4 in magnitude.
21extent to which displays moderate the inertial e ect of past purchases. If state dependence
entirely proxies for search costs and if search costs disappear in the presence of a display, then
we expect that  1    2 =0 .
Figure 8 plots the estimated marginal distribution of the inertia e ect with and without
a display on alternative products. We can see that the two distributions are nearly identical.
There is virtually no evidence that displays a ect persistence in choice. This leads us to
conclude that the measured state dependence is not merely a reduced-form e ect that proxies
for in-store search costs.
The addition of a display main e ect and interaction terms to the model improves the
model ﬁt. The log marginal likelihood increases from -4434 to -4339 with the addition of the
display variables. However, most of this improvement in ﬁt is due to the main e ect terms
(-4434 to -4360). We interpret the ﬁnding that display has a main e ect on the purchase
probability but does not change the measured degree of state dependence as evidence for
a direct utility-enhancing advertising e ect of displays. Whatever the interpretation of the
main e ect of displays, it is clear that that state dependence we estimate does not result from
search behavior.
Learning
It has often been argued that consumers have imperfect knowledge of the quality of products
and that the consumption of a product provides information about its true quality. This may
create persistence in choices over time. For example, suppose a consumer prefers brand B
to brand A under perfect information. However, initially the consumer has only imperfect
knowledge of the product’s quality, and expects that the utility from consuming A is larger
than the utility from consuming B. We then observe the consumer buying brand A until she
gains experience with brand B, for example if she tries B when the product is on promotion.
If learning is important in driving our state dependence ﬁndings, we would expect that
experienced consumers in the category would exhibit less inertia than inexperience consumers.
To proxy for shopping experience, we introduce a dummy for whether the primary shopper in
22the household is over 35 years old. Let  h be the vector of household parameters (including
brand intercepts, price, and the inertia term). We then partition  h into a part associated
with the experienced shopper dummy and into residual unobserved heterogeneity that follows
the mixture of normals distribution:
 h =  zh + uh
uh   N (µind, ind);ind   MN( )
(5.2)
  is a vector which allows the means of all model coe cients to be altered by the experienced
shopped dummy, zh.
We ﬁnd that the model ﬁt is changed only slightly by the addition of the experienced
shopper dummy. The element of   that allows for the possibility of shifting the distribution of
the inertia or state dependence coe cient is imprecisely estimated with a HPD that covers 0.
For margarine, the posterior mean of this element is .17 with a 95 percent Bayesian credibility
region of ( .25,.60). For orange juice the mean is .12 with a 95 percent Bayesian credibility
region of ( 1.9,1.75). We conclude that there is no evidence that experienced shoppers exhibit
a di erent distribution of the inertia coe cient than less experienced shoppers.
A more powerful test of the learning hypothesis involves exploiting the fundamental dif-
ference between state dependence and learning models in terms of the implications for the
behavior of the choice process. Under state dependence, as long as the exogenous variables
(price, in our case) follow a stationary process, the choice process will also be stationary.
However, in any model where learning is achieved through purchase and consumption, the
choice process will be non-stationary. The consumers’ posterior distributions of product qual-
ity will tighten as more consumption experience is obtained and consumers will exhibit less
inertia. Eventually, consumers will behave in accordance with a standard choice model with
no parameter uncertainty.
We will exploit this di erence in behavior to construct a comparison of state dependence
and learning model implications. Our panel is reasonably long and we might expect that
consumers will learn as they obtain more consumption experience with a brand. We deﬁne
23brand level consumption experience as the cumulative number of purchases of the brand, Ejt.
We can interact the inertia or “state dependence” variable with this new experience variable
to provide a means of comparing the learning and pure state dependence models.
ujt =  j +  jpjt +  1I {st = j} +  2I {st = j}·Ejt +  Ejt +  jt (5.3)
Since the experience variable adds additional information to the choice model, we should
not directly compare the log marginal likelihood values of the interaction model (5.3) and the
baseline model (2.1). The hypothesis that state dependence proxies for learning has implica-
tions for the interaction term in equation (5.3). Under learning, the interaction term should
reduce state dependence as brand experience accumulates. Table 4 provides the likelihood
values for each category for a comparison of the model with the interaction term as in (5.3)
with a model containing only a main e ect of brand experience:
ujt =  j +  jpjt +  1I {st = j} +  Ejt +  jt (5.4)
The marginal likelihood values increase by only 6 points when the interaction is added to (5.4)
in the margarine category. In the orange juice category, the addition of the interaction term
reduces the marginal likelihood. Figure 9 veriﬁes that the interaction terms are centered at
0 and contribute little to the model. The red line in the ﬁgure plots the estimated marginal
distribution of  2 in (5.3), while the blue line plots the estimated marginal distribution of  1.
It might be argued that learning models only apply to products for which consumers
have little consumption experience. Substantial evidence for learning has been found for new
products by Ackerberg (2003), and Osborne (2007). Moshkin and Shachar (2002) ﬁnd that
learning explains ﬁndings of state dependence for televisions programs, a product category
with a very large and frequent number of new products. In our case, the same products
have been in the market place for a considerable period of time. The households in the
data might be expected to show little evidence of learning given their experience with the
brands prior to their involvement in the panel. This underscores the importance of a ﬂexible
24model of heterogeneity. As a number of authors have noted, it is hard to distinguish learning
models with heterogeneous initial priors from a standard choice model with brand preference
heterogeneity. Indeed, Shin, Misra, and Horsky (2007) ﬁt a learning model to a product
category populated by well-established products. Once they supplement their data with
survey data on household priors over product qualities, they measure very little learning.
6 The Dollar Value of State Dependence
The inclusion of the outside option in the model enables us to assign money-metric values to
our model parameters simply by re-scaling them by the price parameter (i.e. the marginal
utility of income),
 
 . The ratio represents the dollar equivalent of the utility premium in-
duced by state dependence. The state dependence demand model has the same implications
for consumer behavior as a model where consumers pay a speciﬁc amount of money when
switching products.7 Thus, the dollar equivalent ratio can be interpreted as a switching cost.
Table 5 displays selected quantiles from the distribution of the dollar state dependence
premium across the population of households. Some of the values on which this distribution
puts substantial mass are rather large values, others are small. To provide some sense of
the magnitudes of these values, we also compute the ratio of the dollar loyalty premium to
the average price of the products. For margarine products, the median dollar value of state
dependence is 28 per cent of the average product price; for orange juice, the ratio is slightly
lower at 21 per cent. However, there is a good deal of dispersion in the dollar value of state
dependence. At the 75th percentile of the dollar value distribution, the dollar value of state
dependence is 75 per cent of the purchase price for margarine and 41 per cent for orange juice.
These are large values and of the order of many examples of standard economic (as opposed
to psychologically derived) switching costs. For example, a cell phone termination penalty
of $150 might be much less than total cell phone expenditures over the expected length of
the contract. Another example of switching costs among packaged goods is razors and razor
blades; a consumer needs to purchase a new razor when switching the type of razor blades.
7See Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion.
25Here the monetary switching cost is small relative to razor blade prices (?).
7 Conclusions
Inertia in consumer purchases has been documented in a variety of studies that use frequently
purchased consumer packaged goods. Typically, the lagged brand choice is found to inﬂuence
current brand choice positively and the results are interpreted as evidence in favor of state
dependent demand. It is well known, however, that state dependence can be confounded with
heterogeneity. Households that simply prefer one brand over the others in a product category
exhibit, what appears to be, persistence. In package goods panel data, there are frequent sales
which can induce brand switching and which can, in principle, di erentiate state dependence
from heterogeneity.
Most empirical studies of state dependence use a normal distribution of heterogeneity.
There is good reason to believe that a normal distribution may be inadequate to capture
heterogeneity in many choice model parameters. It remains to be seen if the ﬁndings of state
dependence are robust to a more ﬂexible heterogeneity distribution. We use a mixture of a
large number of multivariate normal distributions and exploit recent innovations in estimation
technology to implement a Bayesian MCMC procedure for this problem.
When applied to data on choices among brands of tub margarine and refrigerated orange
juice, we do, indeed, ﬁnd very substantial evidence of non-normality. Findings of inertia in
brand choice are robust to a ﬂexible distribution of preferences. It might be argued, however,
that our ﬁndings of inertia stem from auto-correlated choice error terms. As Keane (1997) has
pointed out, “state dependence” and auto-correlated error speciﬁcations can produce similar
patterns in the data. The key di erence between state dependence and auto correlation is
that state dependence can be changed by external variables that alter the state and, therefore,
the pattern of persistence in the future. On the other hand, the persistence stemming from
auto-correlated errors cannot be altered. We exploit this di erence between the models to
create a test for auto correlation based on whether the past purchase was initiated by a price
discount or not. We ﬁnd evidence in favor of the state dependent model and against the
26auto-correlated error speciﬁcation.
The structural interpretation of the state dependence model is that, when a brand is
purchased, there is a utility premium accorded that brand in future choices. Equivalently, we
could interpret the state dependence model as a model of switching costs in which a cost is
paid (in utility terms) from switching to brands not bought on the last purchase occasion.
The switching cost interpretation of brand inertia or brand loyalty is based on the existence
of psychological switching costs rather than explicit monetary or product adoption costs.
Alternative structural models which could give rise to inertia in choices are models with
important brand search or learning e ects. In search models, consumers may persist in pur-
chasing one brand if the costs of exploring other options are high. In learning models, what
appears to be inertia can arise because of imperfect information about product quality. Prod-
ucts which a consumer has consumed have less uncertainty in quality evaluation and this may
make consumers reluctant to switch to alternative products for which there is greater quality
uncertainty.
Comparison of the state dependent model to a model with learning or search e ects could
be done conditional on a speciﬁc implementation of the search or learning model. Learning
models, for example, make explicit and restrictive distributional assumption regarding the
likelihood of signal information and priors. Typically, a normal prior and likelihood are
assumed for tractability. This poses a problem for a clean comparison of state dependence
and learning as the comparison is between state dependence and a speciﬁc parametric learning
model. Our approach is to examine those empirical implications of search and learning models
which are di erent than those of a state dependence model.
For search models, we exploit the fact that we have in-store advertising data which can
alter the cost of search. Our ﬁndings are that there is little evidence consistent with a generic
implication of search models for choice under a regime of reduced search costs. For learning
models, we use the non-stationary implications of the learning model for choice behavior. A
state dependent model implies a stationary choice process (controlling for exogenous vari-
ables) while the learning model implies lower persistence in choices as consumers acquire
27more information about a particular brand. The evidence in the data is consistent with the
stationary state dependence framework.
We have established a ﬁrmer basis for the structural interpretation of the state dependent
choice model for demand. This model implies that variables under ﬁrm control, such as prices,
can inﬂuence the future choice behavior of consumers. This opens a number of possibilities for
work on ﬁrm policy. In the companion pieces, Dubé, Hitsch, Rossi, and Vitorino (2008) and
Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi (forthcoming), we explore the implications of the estimates switching
costs for dynamic pricing under multi-product monopoly and dynamic oligopoly respectively.
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31Appendix: MCMC and Prior Settings
The MCMC method applied here is a hybrid method with a customized Metropolis chain
for the draw of the household level parameters coupled with a standard Gibbs sampler for a
mixture of normals conditional on the draws of household level parameters. That is, once the
collection of household parameters are drawn, the MCMC algorithm treats these as “data”
and conducts Bayesian inference for a mixture of normals. Thus, there are “two” stages in the
algorithm.
 h|yh,X h,indh,µ indh, indh h =1 ,...,H (7.1)
ind, ,{µk, k}|  (7.2)
  is matrix consisting of H rows, each with the  h parameters for each household, yh is the
vector choice observations for household h, and Xh is the matrix of covariates. The ﬁrst
stage of the MCMC in (7.1) is a set of H Metropolis algorithms tuned to each household
MNL likelihood. The tuning is done automatically without any “pre-sampling” of draws
and is done on the basis of a fractional likelihood that combines the household likelihood
fractionally with the pooled MNL likelihood (for further details, see Rossi, Allenby, and
McCulloch (2005), chapter 5). It should be noted that this tuning is just for the Metropolis
proposal distribution. This procedure avoids the problem of undeﬁned likelihoods for tuning
purposes. The household likelihood used in the posterior computations is not altered.
The second stage (7.2) is a standard unconstrained Gibbs Sampler for a mixture of normals.
The “label-switching” problem for identiﬁcation in mixture of normals is not present in our
application as we are interested in the posterior distribution of a quantity which is label-
invariant, i.e. the mixture of normal density itself. The priors used are:
    Dirichlet(a)





 k   IW ( , I)
32The prior hyperparameters were assessed to provide proper but di use distributions. a =
(.5/K,K), amu = 1/16,   = dim( h)+3. The Dirichlet prior on   warrants further comment.
The Dirichlet distribution is conjugate to the multinomial.
 
a can be interpreted as the
size of a prior sample of data for which the classiﬁcation of  h “observations” is known. The
number of observations of each “type” or mixture component is given by the appropriate
element of a. Our prior says that each type is equally likely and that there is only a very
small amount of information in the prior equal to a sample “size” of .5. As the number of
normal components increases, we do not want to change how informative the prior is; this is
why we scale the elements of the a vector by K.
Our computer code for this model can be found in the contributed R package, bayesm,
available on the CRAN network of mirror sites (see function rhierMnlRwMixture).
33Table 1: Description of the Data
Margarine





no-purchase (% trips) 45.73
# households 429
# trips per household 18.25
# purchases per household 9.90
Refrigerated Orange Juice
Product Average Price % Trips
64oz MM 2.21 11.1
Premium 64oz MM 2.62 7.00
96oz MM 3.41 14.7
Premium 64oz TR 2.73 28.8
64oz TR 2.26 6.76
Premium 96 oz TR 4.27 7.99
no-purchase (% trips) 23.75
# households 355
# trips per household 12.3
# purchases per household 9.37









Promise .24 .83 .85
Parkay .09 .90 .86
Shedd’s .23 .81 .80









Minute Maid .43 .78 .74
Tropicana .57 .86 .83
35Table 3: Log Marginal Likelihood for State Dependence (SD) Speciﬁcations
Model Margarine Orange Juice
Homogeneous Model without SD -10755 -7612
5 Comp Normal without SD -5575 -4528
5 Comp Normal with lagged prices, no SD -5517 -4389
Homogeneous Model with SD -8175 -6297
5 Comp Normal with SD -5501 -4434
5 Comp, SD, Randomized Purchase Sequence -5581 -4503
5 Comp, SD, Interaction with Discount -5537 -4419
36Table 4: Learning and State Dependence
Model Margarine Orange Juice
5-comp, SD -5551 -4434
5-comp, SD, experienced shopper dummy -5533 -4477
5-comp, SD, main e ect of brand experience -5302 -4264
5-comp, SD, main and interaction e ect of brand exp -5266 -4293
37Table 5: Dollar Value of State Dependence
Margarine















38Figure 1: Margarine Intercepts
39Figure 2: Price and State Dependence Coe cients: Margarine
40Figure 3: Refrigerated Orange Juice Brand Intercepts
41Figure 4: Price and State Dependence Coe cients for Refrigerated Orange Juice
42Figure 5: State Dependence and the Interaction with Price Discounts
43Figure 6: Brand Speciﬁc State Dependence: Margarine
44Figure 7: Brand Speciﬁc State Dependence: Orange Juice
45Figure 8: Interaction Between State Dependence and Display
46Figure 9: Interaction between State Dependence and Prior Brand Consumption
47